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September 30, 2005

What to do in Iraq: Pullout, "Stay the Course" or the Right Thing

I intended to post this a few weeks ago and Katrina made it seem a little out of place but I think I now need to get this off my chest.

I haven't written much about Iraq. My own position has been evolving of late and I think it is time to put a stake in the ground as to where my thought is at this time. Really, every post on Abnormal Interests is about me and my thoughts. Why else would one bother with a blog? This one is even more so about my thoughts and me. The discipline of having to write something down tends to bring clarity to thought or at least expose the places where the thought process is unclear. What are my qualifications in support of the ideas expressed below? None.

Let me start with a few premises:

1) If there was or is a rational reason for attacking Iraq that reason was never made public. Every reason that our government did make public has turned out to be wrong. Of the two principle reasons offered, one, that Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, rested on a major error in intelligence; the other, that attacking Iraq would further the war against Islamic terrorism, was a deliberate lie.

2) The attack on Iraq has actually hardened the will of the terrorists and assisted in their recruitment drive. We are less safe rather than more safe as a result of invading Iraq.

3) Because the Iraqis are unable to police themselves and at this point, no one else will provide meaningful help, a precipitous US withdrawal from Iraq will result in a civil war with a very large number of casualties and an otherwise unpredictable outcome. One, not unreasonable, outcome would be a régime even more repressive than Saddam Hussein's. An agreement on a national constitution will only delay the inevitable.

4) American prestige and honor have been severely tarnished and will be further tarnished by a precipitous withdrawal.

5) As currently being conducted, this war cannot be won even if winning means nothing more than a stable Iraq.

6) It is in the interest of the United States to decrease the extent to which people in the Islamic world see us as an enemy of Islam.

7) Many in the Islamic world as well as many others see our actions in Iraq as immoral and threatening.

If you don't agree with any these premises stop reading. If one of them is wrong then everything else I have to say is false. If you're still with me, you will see that I will be introducing a few other premises along the way so don't think the seven above are exhaustive. One such premise will be the premise of democratic responsibility: in a democracy, all citizens are responsible for the outcome of their government's actions and the results of those actions.

Premises 3 and 4 force me to reluctantly conclude that even with increased numbers of casualties on our part we cannot precipitously withdraw our forces. It is neither in our long-term best interest nor in the interest of the Iraqi people. We have broken it and it is ours. I don't like this conclusion but I think anyone who believes 3 and the second part of 4 is stuck with it. I believe it also violates the premise of democratic responsibility. You'll see why in a little while.

Premise 1 tells me that either we had no justification for invading Iraq or we had some secret justification. In the case of having no justification, our action was clearly immoral. If we had some secret justification, the very fact that it was secret raises the significant probability that it too was immoral. While I personally believe that our attack on Iraq was immoral, my personal opinion is of no importance here. What is important is that much of the world and particularly the Muslim World sees our actions as immoral. Considering premises 6 and 7, being viewed as immoral and the threat to Islam is not in the interest of the United States. So I must take a very practical position. Immoral or not, it is in the interest of the United States for the United States to consider its attack on Iraq immoral. Without doing so, we will never succeed, by any definition, in Iraq or in reducing the extent to which others see us as a threat to Islam. Without doing so, we will never be able to accept the democratic responsibility that is incumbent upon us. Without doing so, we will not be believed in the world in general or in the Islamic world in particular.

That our continued approach is failing (5) indicates that we must do something other than what we are doing. When this conclusion is combined with the inability of the Iraqis to police themselves, our questionable moral position and our democratic responsibility, I believe that our options are very narrow but not zero. So here is what I think needs to be done. I admit that it is high risk and costly but I see no other options that will restore our moral footing in the world or have any hope of producing a stable Iraq.

First, we must admit to the world and to all the various factions in Iraq that the invasion was a mistake. We may even have to go so far as to admit that our actions were immoral. Without a very public confession, we have no hope of regaining the moral high ground. Otherwise, our only choice is to withdraw or "stay the course" and be further humiliated and weakened.

Second, we must publicly and clearly renounce any desire or intention of having a permanent presence in Iraq.

Third, we must go to the United Nations and make arrangements for our military forces to be put under UN or some other acceptable (to the UN) command and that we modify troop levels to meet the requirements of that command to insure that agreed upon goals can be reasonably met. Of course, we would have to maintain veto power over any actions that are immoral or would further our long-term involvement in the region.

Fourth, we must define those goals with considerable precision. My suggestion is that one goal should be to bring equipped and trained Iraqi military troop strength to about 150,000 solders ethnically integrated at the platoon level. Common military goals must be understood at this low level of military organization. This will be very difficult and will take a lot of time and no doubt more than a few small and perhaps large disasters. But it may prevent a monstrous disaster in the long run. Another goal might be to have 130,000 (one per every 200 citizens) trained and fully equipped local police officers. Officers, troops, and police should be trained to standards that would be acceptable for comparable positions in the best armies and police forces in the world. So you'll understand what I am talking about, I believe that this will likely take five to ten years of very focused effort. The US should pay for this equipment and training even as others specify it.

Fifth, we must repair the infrastructure and bring that which doesn't need immediate repair up to date. And we must pay for it but Iraqis should manage the projects and do the work. There will be fraud as there is now but that is something for the Iraqi police to deal with.

Sixth, we must infuse enough capital into Iraq to capitalize an economy that will sustain an average annual income of over $5000.00 per year. I'm not sure of the exact number. I will leave it to the economists to determine the exact requirement for both the required investment and the exact per household target. It is likely that we are talking about several billions of dollars in capital. Under the present circumstances very little of this capital investment should be private. This amount must be beyond the cost of training and equipping the police and army and fixing the infrastructure. The goal is to make Iraq sufficiently prosperous so it has a hope of being stable without also being a dictatorship.

These last three proposals must be done in parallel.

Make no mistake about it. This will be costly both in a drain on our economy and in the lives of our soldiers. But, in my view, we have a moral duty that transcends these costs. We may have to raise taxes and (how I hate to say it) impose a limited, nondiscriminatory draft, because the actions I am recommending may take a long time. We also need to see to it that our own soldiers are equipped with the best that money can buy and that they are provided for medically and economically after their service. The moral duty is to fix what we have so badly broken. Now some on the right will object to everything I have said and suggested. But remember that it was your President that made the series of blunders that got us where we are and you should be willing to pay the price for the mistake of electing and supporting him and his administration. But many liberals want to cut and run and blame it all on Bush and company. To them I say, the results will be on all our heads as the blame is now. How much did each of us in the liberal community give to the prevention of the current disaster: a few hours, a few dollars, perhaps more. But few of us gave everything we could have to stop our government from doing what has proven to be such a disaster. I know I could have done more. For this reason, liberals, who knew better but did little, are just as guilty as those in the Whitehouse. In a democracy, no one can just opt out of his responsibility.

Do I think we will do what I am suggesting? No, we lack the moral will at every level and it is this lack of moral will that got us into this mess in the first place. For that reason, I believe that Juan Cole's ten step proposal is the next best approach that has even a small chance of being implemented. Some of his points like

"9) Congress must rewrite the laws governing US reconstruction aid to Iraq so as to take out provisions that Iraqis must where possible use US companies or materiel. All of the reconstruction money should go directly to Iraqi firms, so as to help jump-start the economy."

are part and parcel of what I think needs to be done.

Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. also has at least a tactical plan that should be incorporated in what I am suggesting.

Instead, U.S. and Iraqi forces should adopt an "oil-spot strategy" in Iraq, which is essentially the opposite approach. Rather than focusing on killing insurgents, they should concentrate on providing security and opportunity to the Iraqi people, thereby denying insurgents the popular support they need. Since the U.S. and Iraqi armies cannot guarantee security to all of Iraq simultaneously, they should start by focusing on certain key areas and then, over time, broadening the effort -- hence the image of an expanding oil spot. Such a strategy would have a good chance of success. But it would require a protracted commitment of U.S. resources, a willingness to risk more casualties in the short term, and an enduring U.S. presence in Iraq, albeit at far lower force levels than are engaged at present. If U.S. policymakers and the American public are unwilling to make such a commitment, they should be prepared to scale down their goals in Iraq significantly.

Notice that Krepinevich is also calling for an increased commitment rather than a reduced one. As Steve's No Direction Home Page says with regard to Krepinevich's suggestion,

Here's another approach to handling the disaster in Iraq. Different than Juan Cole's, but like Cole's approach, and unlike the Bush administration's approach, has the benefit of actually being a plan. Getting out of here without leaving a huge civil war in our wake is going to be, as W might say, "hard work." Too bad he's not doing the hard work.

Still another approach has been offered by Wes Clark. Again, most of his ideas are easily incorporated into mine, or perhaps the other way around.

Posted by DuaneSmith at September 30, 2005 07:06 AM | Read more on Current Events |

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Posted by: bob at October 8, 2005 05:01 AM

Posted by: Duane at October 8, 2005 08:45 AM

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